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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
In February of 2015, the Idaho State Police stopped Debra J. Noeller for 
purportedly committing a traffic offense, detained her for over an hour, and ultimately 
searched the car she was driving.  The district court granted Ms. Noeller’s motion to 
suppress all the evidence against her because the Idaho State Police had no 
reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. Noeller.  The State appeals from the district court’s 
order granting the motion to suppress and argues that the stop was lawful.  The State’s 
cursory argument fails to show that the district court erred. 
    
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On February 10, 2015, Debra Noeller and Roman Tonche were driving on 
Interstate 86; their car was registered in Arizona and bore Arizona license plates.  
(R., pp.117-18.)  Idaho State Trooper Peeples observed that the car appeared to have 
darker window tinting than allowed under Idaho state law.1  (R., p.117.)  Trooper 
Peeples called dispatch to check on the license plate and was told there were no 
warrants associated with the car.  (R., pp.117-18.)  He then stopped the car at 12:22 
p.m.  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.69, L.18.) 
Trooper Peeples testified that when he approached the car, he noticed that 
Ms. Noeller was driving, and there was a male passenger in the car.  (R., p.118.)  He 
said that he walked up to the car on the passenger side, and the passenger rolled down 
the window, so he spoke with the occupants through that window and explained the 
                                            
1 Idaho Code § 49-944 sets the standards for window tinting in Idaho. 
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reason for the stop.  (Prelim. Tr., p.7, L.25 – p.8, L.15.)  Trooper Peeples then asked for 
Ms. Noeller’s license, registration, and proof of insurance.  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.8, 
Ls.23-25.)  According to Trooper Peeples, “there was no indication of drug use and both 
driver’s and passenger’s demeanor was calm.”  (R., p.118.) 
As Ms. Noeller was looking for the documents, Trooper Peeples said he asked 
where they were coming from, and both Ms. Noeller and Mr. Tonche, said they had 
driven up from Arizona.  (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-6, p.49, L.24 – p.50, L.2.)  Trooper 
Peeples then asked where they were going, and Mr. Tonche said they were going to 
“the casino” and asked if the trooper knew where it was. (Prelim. Tr., p.10, Ls.18-23.)  
The trooper said that Mr. Tonche told him his mother was sick, and he was going to the 
casino to meet with someone who knew where her house was located and then driving 
to see her.2  (Prelim. Tr., p.11, Ls.1-6.)  Trooper Peeples then asked how long they 
were planning on staying in Idaho; Ms. Noeller “shrugged her shoulders and shook her 
head,” and Mr. Tonche said it all depended on his mother’s health.  (Prelim. Tr., p.11, 
Ls.14-21.) 
Once Trooper Peeples had the documents from Ms. Noeller, he performed a 
records check, which returned no warrants.  (R., p.118.)  Because he noticed that the 
name on the registration was different than Ms. Noeller’s, Trooper Peeples went back to 
the car and asked who the car belonged to, and Mr. Tonche said that it belonged to his 
wife.  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.6-16.)  Trooper Peeples then asked for 
Mr. Tonche’s identification and conducted a records check on him, which also revealed 
                                            
2 Later, Trooper Call, the backup trooper, testified that Ms. Noeller told him that they got 
lost, and they were trying to meet a family member of Mr. Tonche’s at the casino.  
(Prelim. Tr., p.82, Ls.1-8.) 
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no warrants.  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.16-23.)  The trooper had a “Tint Meter” to 
measure the light transmission of the windows but was not carrying it when he initially 
approached the car, and never used it during the course of the stop, even though 
measuring the window tint was supposedly the purpose of the stop.3  (R., p.118.)   
At that point, Trooper Peeples said he “requested that additional units respond” 
to his location.  (Prelim. Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.1.)  When asked why he did that, he 
said, “[B]ased on the conversation that Mr. Tonche and I had, as well as the lack of 
conversation that Ms. Noeller and I had, I felt that there was, that there was more to – I 
felt that possible criminal activity was involved with this vehicle or these individuals.  
And I wanted to deploy my K9 partner, Apollo.”  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.13, Ls.3-8.)   
Trooper Call arrived on the scene, eight minutes into the detention, at 12:30 p.m., 
and Trooper Peeples asked him to take over the investigation of the stop, giving him the 
driver’s licenses of Ms. Noeller and Mr. Tonche, as well as the registration and 
insurance documents for the car.  (R., p.118.)  Trooper Peeples testified that he had 
abandoned the initial purpose of the stop at that time.  (R., p.119.)  And Trooper Call 
admitted that he never addressed the initial purpose of the stop; he did not have a tint 
meter, and made no attempt to check the tint of the windows.  (R., p.119; Prelim. 
Tr., p.92, L.24 – p.93, L.3.)  Instead, at approximately 12:50 p.m., he told Ms. Noeller 
and Mr. Tonche to get out of the car and stand apart from each other while Trooper 
                                            
3 In its Appellant’s Brief, the State submits that “a trooper also checked the window tint, 
and found the sides and back windows ranging from 32% to 12% light transmission, 
generally darker than allowed by Idaho law.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.1.)  This was not 
done, however, until after the entire stop was over, just prior to the car being towed.  
(Prelim. Tr., p.32, L.15 – p.34, L.4, p.50, L.15 – p.51, L.21.) 
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Peeples had his K9 partner do a “free air sniff” around the car.  (R., p.119; Prelim. 
Tr., p.97, L.19 – p.98, L.6.)  The K9 did not alert.  (R., p.119.) 
During the free air sniff, Trooper Call continued questioning Ms. Noeller, and, 
after the sniff produced no alert, Trooper Peeples continued questioning Mr. Tonche.  
(R., p.119.)  Trooper Peeples and Trooper Call said that they did not inform Ms. Noeller 
or Mr. Tonche that they were free to leave at that point and did not return their driver’s 
licenses, registration, or insurance paperwork.  (R., p.119; Prelim. Tr., p.96, Ls.6-20.)  
Then, after deciding that “things still weren’t making sense with the stop,” and 
Ms. Noeller’s and Mr. Tonche’s “stories were not matching,” Trooper Call re-contacted 
Ms. Noeller and asked for her consent to search the car.  (R., p.119; Prelim. Tr., p.95, 
L.12 – p.96, L.2.)  Ms. Noeller consented, and the troopers took the K9 into the car and 
discovered methamphetamine and a pipe in Ms. Noeller’s purse.  (R., p.119.)  At that 
point, Ms. Noeller was arrested, and Mr. Tonche was placed in handcuffs to detain him 
until the investigation was over.  (R., p.119.)  Subsequently, approximately 500 grams of 
methamphetamine was found in the bumper of the car, and both Ms. Noeller and 
Mr. Tonche were charged with trafficking in methamphetamine.  (R., pp.119-20.)  
Despite its concerns about the length of the stop and the potential right to travel issues 
with the stop, the magistrate court ultimately bound the case over to the district court 
after the preliminary hearing.  (Prelim. Tr., p.111, L.9 – p.113, L.2; R., pp.36-37.)   
Ms. Noeller filed a motion to suppress, and a hearing was held on June 9, 2015.  
(R., p.120.)  After the hearing, the parties submitted briefs.  (R., pp.82-111.)  Ms. Noeller 
argued that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, the troopers 
unlawfully prolonged the stop, and her consent was invalid.  (R., pp.87-93.)    
 5 
The district court granted the motion to suppress.  (R., pp.117-23.)  Relying 
primarily on the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 
(2013), it held that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop a car registered in Arizona 
“for a possible window tint violation under Idaho law.”  (R., p.123.)  The State timely 
appealed.       
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to show that the district court erred by granting Ms. Noeller’s motion 
to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Granting Ms. Noeller’s 
Motion To Suppress 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact 
which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found.  At a suppression hearing, the 
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  
 
State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 301 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted).  
The district court correctly granted Ms. Noeller’s motion to suppress all evidence 
seized in this case because the initial stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.  
Ms. Noeller also argued that the extended duration of the stop and the invalidity of her 
consent supported her motion to suppress.  (R., pp.88-93.)  Although the district court 
did not reach these issues, as argued below, granting the motion to suppress was also 
supported on those bases. 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17.  Warrantless searches and 
seizures are presumptively unreasonable.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
219 (1973); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).  To overcome that presumption, 
the State has the burden of proving that the search or seizure falls within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement and was reasonable in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552, 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.  If the government fails to meet its burden, 
the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or seizure, including later-
 8 
discovered evidence derived from the original illegality, is inadmissible.  Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518–19 (2012). 
 
A. Trooper Peeples Stopped Ms. Noeller Without Reasonable Suspicion 
The district court found that Trooper Peeples did not have reasonable suspicion 
to justify the stop in this case.  (R., pp.120-23.)  “Reasonable suspicion must be based 
on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those 
facts.  Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion.  The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of 
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.”  State v. 
Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
Because warrantless seizures must generally be based on probable cause, Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009), 
limited investigatory detentions such as traffic stops are impermissible unless “justified 
by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about 
to commit, a crime.”  Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. 
The district court held that, while I.C. § 49-944 establishes standards for window 
tinting in Idaho, a potential violation of those standards on an out-of-state vehicle could 
not create reasonable and articulable suspicion that the car had violated a traffic law.4  
(R., p.123.)  In reaching its decision, the district court relied primarily on Morgan, supra, 
                                            
4 The district court took judicial notice of the Arizona window tinting statute.  (R., p.120.)  
Arizona’s tinting requirements for front windows are similar to Idaho’s, but Arizona does 
not limit the degree of tinting that can be applied to the back window and rear windows 
of a vehicle.  (R., pp.115-16.)  The district court also noted that there was no argument 
made that the car Ms. Noeller was driving did not comply with that statute.  (R., p.122.)  
At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Peeples admitted that the front windows were in 
compliance with both Idaho and Arizona law.  (Prelim. Tr., p.47, Ls.5-6.)          
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and State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (2007).  In Morgan, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the Idaho requirement that cars use both front and rear license plates did not apply 
to cars registered in other states.  Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112.  As such, there could be 
no reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop when an out-of-state car displayed only a 
rear license plate.  Id. at 112-13. 
The State argues that the holding in Morgan was “limited to the statute at issue.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  It asserts that, unlike the statute in Morgan, the plain language 
of I.C. § 49-944(2) “shows it applies to any car driven in Idaho.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-
7.)  The State also claims that “[b]ecause the holding of Morgan was limited to the 
statute at issue, the district court erred by reading Morgan as holding that Idaho’s traffic 
laws generally do not apply to motorists from out-of-state.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  
Similarly, the State argues, “[b]ecause Morgan was based on the scope of the statute in 
question, and not on some broad unarticulated concept that none of Idaho’s traffic laws 
apply to out-of-state motorists, the district court’s expansion of Morgan’s holding was 
erroneous.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)   
First, this mischaracterizes the district court’s holding.  The district court did not 
hold that Idaho’s traffic laws generally do not apply to out-of-state motorists.  In fact, it 
specifically said, “[w]hile an out-of-state driver’s conduct, such as their speed, is 
enforced by Idaho law, out-of-state vehicles driven through Idaho cannot be expected to 
comply with all other Idaho vehicle requirements, such as the one at issue here.”  
(R., p.123, emphasis added.)  The district court also noted that a different statute may 
result in a different outcome.  (R., p.123.)  Thus, the district court made it clear that 
while an out-of-state driver’s conduct is certainly subject to regulation under Idaho law, 
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a vehicle’s equipment, such as license plates or window tinting, which are legal in other 
states, cannot be regulated by Idaho law.  “Otherwise, out-of-state vehicles that are only 
required to have a front license plate or that are allowed to have lesser restrictions on 
window tinting would never be able to freely travel through Idaho.”  (R., p.123.) 
Second, the district court’s reliance on Salois was well-founded.  In Salois, the 
State claimed that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car and investigate 
whether its temporary permit was valid.  Salois, 144 Idaho at 348.  The Court of Appeals 
rejected that idea:  “[T]he presence of a properly displayed temporary permit . . . dispels 
any reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-456(1) [the relevant statute].”  Id.  
Allowing otherwise, the Court held, “would allow law enforcement officers of this state 
unfettered discretion to stop each and every vehicle being operated with a temporary 
registration to ‘investigate’ its validity.”  Id.  That was unacceptable because “an officer 
must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, not 
after.”  Id.  The court went on to say, “[a] temporary permit displayed in compliance with 
I.C. § 49-432(3) carries with it a presumption of validity, not of invalidity.”  Id.   
Subsequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, like temporary permits, “a 
properly displayed dealer plate carries with it a presumption of validity and cannot 
serve as the sole basis for reasonable suspicion to allow an officer to stop a vehicle.”  
State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546 (Ct. App. 2015).   
In this case, the district court’s reasoning was similar.  It said, “If an officer 
notices that a vehicle has out-of-state plates as well as window tinting, possibly darker 
than allowed by Idaho law, then the officer is on notice that the window tinting on the 
out-of-state vehicle is not controlled by Idaho law, but by the home state.”  (R., pp.122-
 11 
23.)  The district court went on to say, “[t]he test for reasonable suspicion is based on 
the totality of the circumstances and here, the trooper knew the vehicle was registered 
in Arizona before initiating the stop. The rational inference drawn from that fact is that 
the vehicle’s window tinting is valid in Arizona.”  (R., p.123.)  Indeed, the reasoning in 
Salois and Case applies here; a properly displayed out-of-state license plate carries 
with it the presumption that the car’s window tinting is valid in the state where it is 
registered.  In other words, because the other state licensed the car, there is a 
presumption of validity as to its equipment. 
Third, the scope of the statute actually does support the district court’s decision.  
I.C. § 49-944 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to place, install, affix, or apply any 
window tinting film or sunscreening device to the windows of any motor 
vehicle, except as follows: [subsections (a) though (f) delineate various 
requirements of light transmission and other technicalities] 
 
(2) No person shall operate on the public highways . . . any motor 
vehicle with a windshield or windows which are not in compliance with the 
provisions of this section. 
 
“The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. 
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall 
be given effect without engaging in statutory construction.  The literal words of a statute 
are the best guide to determining legislative intent.”  I.C. § 73-113(1).  However, “[i]f a 
statute is capable of more than one conflicting construction, the reasonableness of the 
proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the statute must be construed as a 
whole.  Interpretations which would render the statute a nullity, or which would lead to 
absurd results, are disfavored.”  I.C. § 73-113(2); see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (“A statute is ambiguous where the 
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language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.”)  Additionally, in 
construing a statute, “[l]anguage of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum.  
And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine 
the legislature’s intent.”  Lockhart v. Dep’t of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897 
(1992), quoting Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 706 (1983).  
  In this case, the use of the terms “any person,” “no person,” and “any motor 
vehicle”—as they are used in sections 1 and 2 of I.C. § 49-944—render the statute 
ambiguous as those terms are capable of more than one conflicting construction.  The 
State interprets the statute to “foreclose the district court’s analysis that cars registered 
in Arizona fall outside the scope of this statute” because section 2 uses the term “any 
motor vehicle.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  But the State’s interpretation ignores the fact 
that the same term is used in section 1, where it cannot be interpreted as applying to 
out-of-state vehicles.  As such, the State’s interpretation violates the rule that statutes 
must be construed as a whole without separating one section from another. 
In Lockhart, the Department of Fish and Game argued that because I.C. § 67-
5317(3) of the Personnel System Act did not “specify which district court was referred 
to,” this “left a void” which required referencing the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. at 
896.  The Court disagreed.  It said, “supplying I.C. § 67-5317(3) with the definition of 
‘district court’ contained in I.C. § 67-5317(2),5 we not only give effect to the probable 
legislative intent but we also follow the rule of statutory construction that statutes should 
be construed as a whole.”  Id. at 897.   
                                            
5 The definition of district court in section 2 was “the district court for the county in which 
any party to the proceeding resides.”  Id.      
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In this case, the same logic applies; I.C. § 49-944(1) states that it is “unlawful for 
any person to . . . apply window tinting film . . . to the windows of any motor vehicle” that 
does not meet the Idaho specifications.  Despite this seemingly broad language, section 
1 clearly cannot control the citizens of other states, or the window tinting they may 
lawfully apply to their vehicles.  Indeed, it is not unlawful for any person in the country to 
apply darker window tinting than is allowed under Idaho law, only any person in Idaho.  
A resident of Alaska, for example, would not fall under the scope of section 1 and be 
required to follow its requirements when applying window tinting to his car that is 
registered in his home state.  As such, the implicit definitions of “any person” and “any 
motor vehicle,” as used in section 1, are “any person in Idaho,” and “any motor vehicle 
registered in Idaho.” 
 Therefore, when construing the statute as a whole, I.C. § 49-944(2) cannot apply 
to out-of-state cars.  Section 2 cannot be separated from section 1 and considered in a 
vacuum.  Indeed, I.C. § 73-113(2) requires that the term “any motor vehicle” in section 2 
be interpreted the same way as it is in section 1.  Similarly, “no person,” as it is used in 
section 2, must be defined as “no person in Idaho.” 
Morgan supports such a reading.  The statute at issue in Morgan, I.C. § 49-428, 
does not specifically indicate that it applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho.  It 
states, “License plates assigned to a motor vehicle shall be attached, one (1) in the front 
and the other in the rear . . . .”  I.C. § 49-428(1) (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]his requirement does not extend to vehicles 
registered in other states.”  Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. 
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Finally, if this Court were to adopt the State’s interpretation of I.C. § 49-944(2), 
then the only way for citizens of other states with more liberal tinting regulations to avoid 
infractions would be to simply stay out of Idaho.  As the district court explained, drivers 
of vehicles registered in states with “lesser restrictions on window tinting would never be 
able to freely travel through Idaho.” 6  (R., p.123.)  Surely the legislature does not intend 
that out-of-state citizens, who own cars that comply with their own state’s laws, should 
be responsible for checking all Idaho vehicle equipment laws and making 
modifications—such as installing a front license plate or somehow modifying window 
tinting—to their vehicle before taking a vacation in or driving through Idaho.  Morgan 
certainly supports this.  Thus, the district court’s reliance on Morgan was appropriate, 
and the State’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. 
  
B. Trooper Peeples Unlawfully Prolonged The Traffic Stop 
 
Trooper Peeples stopped Ms. Noeller because he suspected that the car’s 
window tinting might be in violation of Idaho Code.  (R., pp.117-18.)  However, Trooper 
Peeples admitted that he never checked the tinting level, and abandoned that purpose 
within eight minutes of the initial stop.  (R., pp.118-19; Prelim Tr., p.69, L.18 – p.70, L.4.)  
He testified that he asked Trooper Call, when he arrived at the scene, to continue the 
investigation of the tinting.  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.70, Ls.3-6.)  But Trooper Call 
                                            
6 The magistrate court was concerned about this issue also.  It said, “Everybody with an 
out-of-state plate is not up to no good and carrying drugs through this state.  And I’m a 
bit concerned that the right to freely travel the roads of this state is becoming something 
that is of concern for anybody with an out-of-state plate.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.112, Ls.1-5.)  
The magistrate court went on to say, “There is a right to travel freely around these 
United States and I think we have to be careful when we stop folks, that we’ve got a 
reason to stop them, and a good reason to stop them.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.112, Ls.18-21.) 
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admitted that he never pursued the purpose of the stop either.  (R., p.119, Prelim. 
Tr., p.92, L.24 – p.93, L.3.)       
Once the purpose of the stop is achieved, the detention must end.  “[A]n 
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Similarly, the investigative methods employed should 
be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's 
suspicion in a short period of time.”  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 420 (2005).  Even though a routine traffic stop can 
“turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions 
unrelated” to the initial purpose for the stop, State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613 
(Ct. App.1990), law enforcement cannot extend a completed traffic stop to conduct a 
canine sniff without reasonable suspicion.  Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 
1614 (2015).  The Rodriguez Court specifically stated that “a police stop exceeding the 
time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's 
shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic 
violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.”  Id. at 1612 
(quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407) (emphasis added).  The Court made it clear 
that unless there was additional reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer had 
to allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop was completed.  Id. at 
1614. 
Although the required information leading to formation of reasonable suspicion in 
the mind of the police officer is less than the information required to form probable 
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cause, it still “must be more than mere speculation or a hunch on the part of the police 
officer.”  State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).  The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop, and the “’whole picture’ must yield a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been 
engaged in wrongdoing.”  State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).   
In this case, Trooper Peeples prolonged the stop based on nothing more than a 
hunch, and he never addressed the supposed purpose for the stop.  He had a tint meter 
in his vehicle, but, as the district court found, he “was not carrying it and did not make 
any attempt to check the window tint . . . during the stop.”  (R., p.118.)  When 
questioned as to why, Trooper Peeples said that the tint meter was approximately six 
inches long — a little bigger than a wallet — but he did not want to carry it in his pocket 
because he was concerned about officer safety and did not want to approach a car with 
the “hazard of carrying a tint meter . . . .”  (Prelim. Tr., p.48, Ls.1-14.)  Even if this 
explanation is rational, Trooper Peeples never went back to his car for the tint meter 
during the stop.  Clearly, from the beginning, he was only interested in fishing to find 
some evidence of a crime, no matter how long it took.   
Trooper Peeples also attempted to characterize his interaction with Ms. Noeller 
as justifying his prolonged detention of her.  He admitted that he approached the car on 
the passenger side and spoke to the occupants through that window.  (Prelim. Tr., p.7, 
L.17, p.8, L.12.)  He said that he asked, “[H]ow are you doing or how’s things going or 
something like that,” and told them why he had stopped them.  (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.13-
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15.)  He said, “[D]uring this time, I had eye contact with the driver, as I do with all other 
stops I’ve done.  I have contact with the driver because that’s the person I’m talking to.”  
(Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.15-18.)  He then said, “And I noticed the passenger was, was 
answering all the questions, or was answering and making the conversation with me.”  
(Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.18-20.)  On cross-examination, however, Trooper Peeples admitted 
that he actually said nothing that would require an answer at that point; he just 
addressed the couple by saying “[G]ood afternoon or how are you doing or something 
like that.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.50, Ls.3-9.)  He also admitted that Ms. Noeller answered the 
first question he asked.  He said he asked where they were coming from, and both 
Ms. Noeller and Mr. Tonche said they were coming from Arizona.  (Prelim. Tr., p.49, 
L.24 – p.50, L.14.) 
After he had Ms. Noeller’s license, registration, and insurance, Trooper Peeples 
said he took the documents back to his vehicle and conducted a records check on 
Ms. Noeller.  (Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.6-7.)  The check revealed no warrants.  (R., p.118.)  
Because the name on the registration was not Ms. Noeller’s, Trooper Peeples went 
back to the car and — upon being told that the car belonged to Mr. Tonche’s wife — 
asked for Mr. Tonche’s identification.  (Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.7-17.)  Trooper Peeples then 
conducted a records check on him.  (Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.18-21.)  This check also 
revealed no warrants.  (R., p.118.)  Trooper Peeples also admitted that he “confirmed 
the names and address on . . . the registration and insurance versus Mr. Tonche’s 
identification that he gave to me.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.22-23.)   
Nevertheless, Trooper Peeples then called for backup.  When asked why, he 
said, “[B]ased on the conversation that Mr. Tonche and I had, as well as the lack of 
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conversation that Ms. Noeller and I had, I felt that there was, that there was more to – I 
felt that possible criminal activity was involved with this vehicle or these individuals.  
And I wanted to deploy my K9 partner, Apollo.”  (R., p.118; Prelim. Tr., p.13, Ls.3-8.)   
This alleged lack of conversation, if it could be characterized as such, was 
entirely normal under the circumstances and cannot be the basis for reasonable 
suspicion.  First, Trooper Peeples approached the car on the passenger side where 
Mr. Tonche was sitting, so it was logical that Mr. Tonche would feel compelled to speak 
to him.  Second, most of the initial questions involved their destination, which was to 
visit Mr. Tonche’s mother.  Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for Mr. Tonche to tell 
Trooper Peeples about that situation instead of Ms. Noeller. 
Indeed, at that point, based on the interaction he had with Ms. Noeller and 
Mr. Tonche, the documentation provided to him, the fact that both Ms. Noeller and 
Mr. Tonche were, as Trooper Peeples said, calm and showed no signs of drug use, and 
the fact that the records checks revealed no warrants, Trooper Peeples had no 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Ms. Noeller or Mr. Tonche were or 
had been engaged in any criminal activity.7  Any suspicion that Trooper Peeples had 
was not reasonable.  Therefore, he should have either finally checked the tint on the car 
and issued a citation or told them they were free to go.  There should have been no dog 
sniff and no further questioning.  Rodriguez, made that abundantly clear. 
                                            
7 Trooper Peeples also said that he thought the fact that there was no luggage in the 
backseat was “odd” because they were on an “extended trip.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.7-
16.)  It is common knowledge that people often put luggage in the trunk, and entirely 
innocent behavior cannot be considered a fact that would contribute to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  See State v. Kelley, No. 43392, 2016 WL 3361870, at *2 
(Idaho Ct. App. June 16, 2016) (holding that driving on Interstate 84 is insufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion). 
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Instead, Trooper Peeples continued the detention to perform a free air sniff with 
his drug dog.  (R., p.119.)  The drug dog did not alert.  (R., p.119.)  Still the detention 
continued.  (R., p.119.)  
While the dog sniff took place, Trooper Call questioned Ms. Noeller.  (R., p.119.)  
But after the drug dog did not alert, Trooper Peeples never told Ms. Noeller that she 
was free to leave.  (R., p.119.)  Instead, he started questioning Mr. Tonche, and Trooper 
Call retained their drivers’ licenses as well as their registration and insurance 
documents.  (R., p.119.)   
This was yet another juncture at which Trooper Peeples should have let the 
couple drive away.  Trooper Peeples admitted that at that point he had no warrant, no 
consent to search, no search incident to an arrest, nothing in plain view, and no alert by 
the dog.  (Prelim. Tr., p.60, Ls. 1-10.)  Nevertheless, Trooper Call continued to question 
Ms. Noeller while Trooper Peeples went back to questioning Mr. Tonche.  (R., p.119.)  
An officer may not continue asking questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop 
unless suspicious circumstances justify that questioning.  Myers, 118 Idaho at 613.      
The troopers had no reasonable suspicion to justify telling Ms. Noeller and 
Mr. Tonche to get out of the car so Trooper Peeples could run his drug dog around the 
car, and they certainly had no reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the stop after 
the drug dog did not alert.8 
                                            
8 The magistrate court was clearly also concerned about this.  It said, “I think the 
envelope’s being pushed on this case.  A 30-minute detention before a fresh air sniff 
that took about five-minutes, no more than five-minutes, more.  We’re at 40-minutes on 
a tinted window on an out-of-state car.  They were detained and free to leave and being 
asked for consent 40-minutes later.  Based on the testimony I have, reasonable, 
articulable suspicion is questionable.”  (Prelim. Tr., p.111, Ls.11-17.) 
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C. Ms. Noeller’s Consent To A Search Of The Car Was Ineffective Because It Was 
Tainted By The Prolonged Stop 
 
Consent given when the defendant is illegally detained is invalid.  “[C]onsent to 
search, given during an illegal detention, is tainted by the illegality and, thus, is 
ineffective.”  State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 535 (Ct. App. 2000), citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983).  In Zavala, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that 
“there is no distinction between an illegal arrest and an illegal detention for purposes of 
the rule” that an illegal arrest taints any subsequent consent to search.  Id.  Here, 
because Ms. Noeller was illegally detained well beyond the purpose of the stop, her 
consent was tainted and therefore ineffective. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the 
unlawful stop, detention, and arrest.  Therefore, Ms. Noeller respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the order suppressing the evidence.  
DATED this 27th day of July, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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